In section 4 of David Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he presents the famous problem of induction. His essential idea is that we are not justified to assert that the future will resemble the past. I generally agree with this, however, I do not understand how it completely vitiates the scientific method or any other form of inductive reasoning. Hume is certainly right when he says that there is no a priori reason to think that the future will resemble the past. However, in the past, we have always observed that the future does, in fact, resemble the past. Shouldn't this observation mean that we are slightly more justified in believing, for instance, that a pencil will fall toward the ground as oppose to float (even though we can’t ever know with absolute certainty what will happen)? I say this because Hume tends to think that there is no difference between, for instance, the prediction that the pencil will fall and the prediction that the pencil will float. Aren't the laws presented by science at least slightly more reasonable because they have always been true in the past?
Thanks.