Suppose there existed a “teleporting” machine that worked by scanning your body and creating an exact duplicate of you, atom by atom. Assume that the replica would have the same personality and memories that you have (that is, don’t consider the possibility of your selfhood residing in an inmaterial soul) and that the procedure is instantaneous, so from the point of view of the replica it has just been teleported, having a continuous experience from being at one place to being at another. Then, is there any reason to consider “you” to be the version of you that remains at the same place, instead of the replica? If the machine works by killing the original “you” at the same time that creating the replica, is stepping in the machine a form of suicide or just a convenient way of transportation?
So would "you" die, if you were destroyed and an exact replica was instantly created somewhere else? Would "you" die, if the replica was created 5-20 seconds before the original you would be destroyed?
I haven't reached any conclusions yet, but the logic and fact seem to point toward a new concept of self-identity.
This article shows that the mind is not all-knowing and would probably not notice being destroyed and rebuild a few years or seconds later.
So if we had two exact copies of ie you, the reader of this post, killing one of you wouldn't matter, you would live on. Or would you? One person would still die and it seems to me that they're both you. But if you both have the same conciousness and other atributes, it wouldn't matter who i'd kill.
Well that's enough for me, i'd be happy to hear your opinions, sorry for killing you btw.